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Abstract. Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) is
the next generation communication technology selected for allowing com-
mercial and military aircraft to deliver flight information to both ground
base stations and other airplanes. Today, it is already on-board of 80%
of commercial aircraft, and it will become mandatory by the 2020 in the
US and the EU. ADS-B has been designed without any security consid-
eration — messages are delivered wirelessly in clear text and they are
not authenticated.
In this paper we propose Securing Open Skies (SOS), a lightweight and
standard-compliant framework for securing ADS-B technology wireless
communications. SOS leverages the well-known µTESLA protocol, and
includes some modifications necessary to deal with the severe bandwidth
constraints of the ADS-B communication technology. In addition, SOS
is resilient against message injection attacks, by recurring to majority
voting techniques applied on central community servers. Overall, SOS
emerges as a lightweight security solution, with a limited bandwidth
overhead, that does not require any modification to the hardware already
deployed. Further, SOS is standard compliant and able to reject active
adversaries aiming at disrupting the correct functioning of the commu-
nication system. Finally, comparisons against state-of-the-art solutions
do show the superior quality and viability of our solution.
1 Introduction
For years, the surveillance of air traffic has been performed through a combina-
tion of legacy radar technologies and human control [1]. Communication systems
such as the Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) leverage on ground-based sta-
tions, that periodically interrogate transponders on-board of the aircraft to get
information about the current status of the flight [2].
Starting from 2020, a new communication technology, namely Automatic De-
pendent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B), will become mandatory on all the
commercial and military aircraft in the US and EU, by following specifications
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published by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Radio Tech-
nology Commission Aeronautics (RTCA) [3]. Anticipatory to the regulations, a
few companies (e.g., Qatar Airways, American Airlines and British Airways)
have already adopted the ADS-B standard.
ADS-B uses the same frequency spectrum of the previous SSR technology,
but the communications are initiated by the aircraft, that periodically broadcasts
messages reporting position, speed and other airplane-related information [4].
On the one hand, ADS-B provides a lot of advantages, both from the system
perspective and from the costs side. On the other hand, it poses a lot of concerns
regarding communication security. In fact, messages are delivered in clear text
and without any inherent mechanism to guarantee their authenticity. This paves
the way to a huge variety of threats, such as the one introduced by the capillary
diffusion of cheap Software Defined Radios (SDRs), able to inject custom-made
packets in the air without requiring specific skills by operating entities [2].
Dealing with security issues in the context of avionic operations is a challeng-
ing task. In fact, avionic firms are often very slow to implement changes in their
routines, due to business and regulatory concerns. In addition, the task is further
complicated by both constraints in the communication bandwidth and the high
message loss experienced on the single link due to obstacles and congestion [5].
In the last years, with the approaching of the cited deadline, researchers from
both academia and industry started formulating solutions to overcome these
vulnerabilities. While a part of them focused on non-cryptographic security so-
lutions, others still pushed for cryptography-based approaches. However, these
latter contributions did not maintain compatibility with the latest standards, re-
quiring substantial modifications to the message size, the available bandwidth, or
the hardware to be used on-board of equipped aircraft (see Sec. 2 for a detailed
overview).
Contributions Our contributions are manifold. First, we propose Securing Open
Skies (SOS), a standard-compliant framework integrating the well-known Timed-
Efficient Streamed Loss Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol and allow-
ing the verification of the authenticity of ADS-B messages on a time-slot basis,
without resorting to resource-demanding public-key cryptography solutions. Sec-
ond, the integration is carried out in a standard compliant fashion. Third, the
framework allows for a joint processing of all the received packets on dedicated
community servers, thus overcoming limitations due to the distributed nature
of the network and the not negligible message loss on standalone receiving an-
tennas. Moreover, SOS does not require hardware modification of the ADS-B
receivers already deployed, thus being easy to integrate through a simple soft-
ware update. Finally, a thorough evaluation of SOS against competing solutions
allows to establish its superior performance in terms of bandwidth overhead and
provided security.
Roadmap The paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 reviews the recent literature
on the topic; Sec. 3 introduces the preliminary details about the ADS-B technol-
ogy, the TESLA protocol and the adversary model; Sec. 4 provides the details
of SOS, while Sec. 5 analyzes the performance of the proposed solution and pro-
vides a comparison against state-of-the-art approaches, showing the superiority
of our solution. Finally, Sec. 6 tightens conclusions and draws future work.
2 Related Work
The huge amount of work dealing with security in the context ADS-B technology
can be divided in two main branches. From one side, grounding on the considera-
tion that the scarce amount of bytes available in a ES1090 packet (see Sec. 3.1 for
more details) does not allow for the inclusion of reliable cryptography solutions,
many contributions focused on providing security services through additional
system-level approaches. To provide an example in this direction, the authors
in [5] propose a two-stage location verification scheme. During an offline stage
it creates a fingerprint of a particular aircraft, leveraging both Time Difference
of Arrival (TDoA) values and deviations from nominal behavior. Then, in the
online phase, it compares the received values with the fingerprint and evaluates
the feasibility of the received data. In another work by the same authors [6], they
propose an intruder detection algorithm based on the received signal strength,
combining the measurements at the two antennas on board of an ADS-B aircraft.
Also, privacy issues are investigated in [7].
From the opposite side, other contributions still strive for cryptography based
approaches, contextualizing their adoption in the severe constraints of the ADS-
B technology. Authors in [8] use a Staged Identity Based Encryption (IBE)
(SIBE) scheme to provide confidentiality in ADS-B communications. In their
scheme, an aircraft uses the public key of a specific ground station to encrypt
a message containing a random symmetric key. The ground station is the only
entity able to decrypt the message with its private key, and then all subsequent
communications use this new symmetric key. Even if the proposal is valuable,
authors are converting a broadcast communication channel in a unicast com-
munication channel, thus heavily modifying the logic and the functioning of the
ADS-B technology. Authors in [9] propose a three-level Hierarchical Identity
Based Signature (IBS) (HIBS) scheme, in which each aircraft, associated to a
given airlines recognized by a root authority (as ICAO or EUROCONTROL)
is able to sign its ADS-B OUT messages by using keys generated according to
its identity. Upon reception of a given signed message, a ground controller is
able not only to identify the generating aircraft, but also its relationship with a
given airline, approved by the root authority. However, being rooted on bilinear
pairings, this scheme incurs a very high message fragmentation and overhead,
thus being very hard to really be implemented in commercial aircrafts (more
details will be provided in Sec. 5.2). In [10] and [11] the authors propose to
use the Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) technique to assure in-
tegrity and authenticity of ADS-B messages. To reduce the message overhead of
their solution, they split the cryptographic value between several concatenated
messages, and verify the cryptographic validity of the HMAC value only when
all the portions are correctly received. However, the digests are computed over
each single message, generating a very high communication overhead. In addi-
tion, they change the computation of the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) field,
thus making their proposal not standard compliant.
As for the adoption of the TESLA authentication scheme in the ADS-B
technology, only few previous contributions have discussed its feasibility. While
[2] briefly highlights potential benefits and drawbacks of such an approach, recent
work [12] and [13] delved into details, providing also an initial implementation of
the solution using SDR. However, these approaches are not standard compliant
and they did not consider the constraints of the communication technology,
neither with regards to the message size nor with respect to the severe bandwidth
requirements highlighted in Sec. 3.1. In addition, their integration in a complete
security framework, as well as their interaction with a set of community receivers,
is not considered.
To sum up, by considering both branches of the current literature discussed
above, we highlight that cryptography-based solutions are the only possible way
to secure the ADS-B system in a fully reliable fashion. However, a standard com-
pliant solution that is able to integrate security services while maintaining the
full compatibility with the standard and guaranteeing a tolerable overhead on
the communication side is still missing. In this context, SOS emerges a standard-
compatible approach, that integrates cryptography in the ADS-B communica-
tions by requiring a limited amount of additional packets to be exchanged on
the wireless channel.
3 Preliminaries and Adversary Model
3.1 ADS-B in a nutshell
Despite its mandatory adoption on-board of commercial flights has been sched-
uled for the 2020, the ADS-B technology was born in the late 1980s, in corre-
spondence with the introduction of the satellite technology, and it was originally
designed to work aside with legacy communication technologies such as Primary
Surveillance Radar (PSR) and SSR [11].
The system has been designed to be Automatic, given that it just needs
to be turned on to work as intended, Dependant because it requires dedicated
operating airborne equipment, Surveillance, because it is used as the primary
surveillance method for controlling aircraft worldwide, and finally Broadcast, due
to the particular operational mode, in which the information is sent in broadcast
[2]. The reference communication model is depicted in Fig. 1.
An aircraft equipped with the ADS-B technology is able to obtain its position
through satellites; then, it broadcasts its position via dedicated ADS-B messages.
The wireless operations can take place at two different frequencies: the 1090MHz
frequency band, namely Extended Squitter - 1090 MHz (ES1090), is used when
the aircraft is above the height of 18,000 ft (about 5.5 km), while below this
threshold the communications take place using the 978MHz frequency band, re-
ferred to as Universal Access Transceiver (UAT), to avoid further congestion on
 Fig. 1. Overview of the ADS-B Communication Model.
the ES1090 frequency band (due to the operation of previous technologies). In
both cases, the dedicated channel bandwidth is 50kHz. The information deliv-
ered by the aircraft can be both received by Air Traffic Control (ATC) ground
stations, that can use them as a replacement or as a validation source for SSR,
or by other aircrafts.
The advantages deriving by the adoption of the ADS-B technology are mani-
fold. First, ADS-B can improve pilots’ situation awareness. In fact, pilots become
able to receive traffic information about surrounding ADS-B enabled aircraft,
weather reports, and temporary flight restrictions. In addition, the cost of in-
stalling ADS-B ground stations is significantly cheaper with respect to installing
and operating the PSR and SSR systems previously used. Moreover, ADS-B pro-
vides better visibility to the aircraft with respect to legacy radar technologies,
being able to guarantee an acceptable transmission range also in harsh regions
(about 250 Nautical Miles, i.e., 450 km). At the data-link level, the ADS-B
message is encapsulated in Mode-S frames. As such, ADS-B uses Pulse-Position
Modulation (PPM) and the replies/broadcasts are encoded by a certain number
of pulses, each pulse being 1 µs long [14].
From the system perspective, ADS-B consists of two different subsystems,
ADS-B OUT and ADS-B IN. ADS-B OUT is the service that allows the air-
craft to periodically broadcasts information about the aircraft itself, such as
identification information, current position, altitude, and speed, through a ded-
icated on-board transmitter. The ADS-B IN service, in parallel, allows for the
reception of Flight Information Service - Broadcast (FIS-B), Traffic Information
Service - Broadcast (TIS-B) data and other ADS-B messages by the aircraft, as
a result of a direct communication from nearby aircraft.
UAT and ES1090 have different payload requirements. The UAT technology
dedicates 272 bits (34 bytes) to the payload, while 36 and 112 bits are allocated
for synchronization information (SYNC) and forward error correction parity in-
formation (FEC PARITY), respectively [3]. As for ES1090, the structure of the
packet is showed in Fig. 2.
While the preamble is used for synchronization purposes, the Downlink For-
mat (DF) field provides an indication of the transmission encoding, the Capa-
bility field is used to report the capability of an ADS-B transmitting installation
 Preamble
(8 bits)
DF
(5 bits)
Capability
(3 bits)
ICAO Address
(24 bits)
Payload
(56 bits)
Parity PI
(24 bits)
Type
(8 bits)
Altitude
(12 bits)
T
(1 bit)
F
(1 bit)
Latitude
(17 bits)
Longitude
(17 bits)
Fig. 2. ADS-B ES1090 message format.
that is based on a Mode-S transponder, the ICAO Address Field is reserved to
the unique identification of the aircraft, while the Parity Information (PI) field
provides error detection. A total number of 56 bits are reserved for the payload,
where the Type field (8 bits) identifies the specific type of the payload message,
the type T flag is used for synchronization purposes, the Subfield F flag indicates
if the following position data are the even (0) or the odd (1) part of the message,
while Altitude, Latitude and Longitude are reserved for data about the actual
position of the aircraft.
Finally, we highlight that the standard currently recommends (without forc-
ing it) an overall maximum transmission rate of 6.2 messages per seconds, aver-
aged over 60 seconds time interval.
3.2 Security Considerations
The ADS-B protocol does not include any security mechanism. Indeed, messages
are transmitted in clear-text, allowing anyone equipped with a compatible re-
ceiver to decode their content and easily access to the information contained
therein. This choice was done in the 80s to boost message availability. However,
nowadays it is the cause of dreadful threats associated with the operation of the
ADS-B technology. In fact, the wide availability of cheap Commercial Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) SDRs opens the possibility to easily inject custom-made ADS-B
messages on the wireless communication channel. Thus, it is very easy to perform
a number of message injection attacks, including Aircraft Spoofing, Ghost Air-
craft Injection/Flooding, Aircraft Disappearance, and Trajectory Modification,
to name a few [15], [2].
However, the public availability of aircraft’s data has the potential to strengthen
the control on the avionic traffic and help establishing open initiatives to main-
tain the security of the sky navigation. In fact, the openness of the system
inspired the rise of many collaborative networks, such as the OpenSky-Network
project [16]. OpenSky-Network is a community-based receiver network, which
continuously collects ADS-B data delivered from operational airplanes. In ad-
dition, OpenSky-Network makes data accessible to researchers worldwide for
experimentation and testing.
As it will clearly emerge from the discussion in the following sections, the SOS
protocol leverages a community-oriented approach on the receiver side, inspired
by the presence of projects such as the OpenSky-Network. This allows the overall
system to be inherently able to overcome limitations such as the potential loss of
messages and the limited computational capabilities of single receiver antennas.
3.3 Adversary Model
In this work we assume a very powerful attacker, characterized by both passive
and active features. The adversary is able to eavesdrop all the communications
on the 1090 MHz frequency band, by assuming the use of COTS devices such
as a SDR [17]. Moreover, it is also able to inject fake messages over the wireless
communication channel, by pretending to be a legitimate aircraft. This is indeed
possible thanks to the presence of cheap SDRs, held at the ground level, able to
forge fake messages and deliver them on the wireless communication channel. We
also assume that the adversary, in order to stay stealthy, follows the constraints
of the ADS-B technology on the transmission rate: thus, it injects packets with a
transmission rate within the limits imposed by the standard. Finally, we assume
that the adversary is able to carry on the attack only for a reduced portion of the
area covered by the flight, i.e., it is static and does not move with the aircraft.
3.4 The TESLA protocol
The Timed-Efficient Streamed Loss Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol
was initially proposed in [18] to authenticate media streams in a lightweight
and time-efficient way, without resorting to resource-consuming public key cryp-
tography solutions. In TESLA the time is divided in epochs, with each epoch
i having a well-defined starting and ending time. It also assumes a loose syn-
chronization between the communicating parties. To provide authentication of
broadcast messages, the entity that generates the messages is equipped with
an initial secret, namely the root key, shared only with a well-known authority,
known to all the parties. At the boot-up of the system, the authority provides
an initial key, namely key chain commit, generated by hashing the root key a
number n of consecutive times. This element is shared on the communication
channel and it is known to all the parties involved in the communication. A
message, i.e., mi, is authenticated by appending a HMAC generated through a
key Ki, obtained by hashing the initial key chain commit exactly n− i times.
The security of the scheme lies in the fact that the key used to generate
the HMAC in the epoch i is not shared before the ending of the epoch itself.
Thus, the receiving entities simply store the messages received in the slot, but
they cannot verify them immediately (because of the lack of knowledge about
the symmetric key). Only after a disclosure lag d in epochs, the key is disclosed
(in broadcast) on the communication channel and included in all the packets
generated exactly d epochs after, allowing the verification of all the messages
delivered by the transmitting entity exactly d epochs before. Note that the key
disclosed by the transmitting entity is assumed to be genuine only if it allows, by
i consecutive hashing operations, to obtain exactly the key chain commit. In this
way, because of the one-way features of the hashing operation, the authenticity
is guaranteed. Despite its success and wide adoption, TESLA was not designed
for severe constrained environments. To cope with this limitation, in µTESLA
the key is not disclosed in each packet, but only once per epoch [19]. In addition,
taking care of the constraints in the size of the memory of sensors, µTESLA
also restricts the number of authenticated senders, thus limiting the memory
footprint of the protocol.
As it will emerge in the following sections, the proposed framework leverages
the core logic of the µTESLA protocol, even if it provides further modifications
necessary to deal with the limited payload size of ADS-B messages.
4 The SOS framework
4.1 Preliminary considerations
The system scenario assumed hereby involves the following actors:
– Aircraft. It is an ADS-B equipped plane, emitting standard-compliant ADS-B
messages.
– Avionics Authority. It is a super-parties authority, whose responsibility is to
assign cryptography materials and unique addresses to operating aircraft.
It is assumed to be online at least for a small amount of time during the
operation of the aircraft. This role is the one natively assumed by ICAO and
EUROCONTROL.
– Receiver Antennas. They are a set of ADS-B receivers, distributed over a
large area, able to receive and successfully decode the messages delivered
by the aircraft. In addition, they are supposed to forward the received mes-
sages to a remote server. This role is actually played by OpenSky Receiver
Antennas.
– Community. It represents a set of general-purpose servers that receive mes-
sages from the distributed antennas and provide additional computing intel-
ligence to validate their authenticity and web-oriented services. This role is
actually played by the OpenSky-network project.
In the following we assume that the legitimate ADS-B-equipped aircraft has
already taken off from an airport, and it has exceeded the altitude of 5,500
meters. Thus, it switches from UAT to ES1090 mode, and starts emitting stan-
dard ADS-B messages. The set of wireless receivers in its communication range,
equipped with ADS-B decoders, are able to detect and decode the messages.
Next, they deliver all the messages to the servers community. The aim of the
SOS framework is to provide authentication of the messages that have been
effectively transmitted by the transmitting plane.
We also assume that the receivers and the transmitter are loosely synchro-
nized with a common clock source, such as the UTC or the GPS system. In
addition, the time is divided in time-slots of a given duration di. Assuming t0 is
the time of the boot-up of the aircraft, the time-slot ti will trigger at the absolute
value ti = t0+
∑i−1
j=0 dj . Finally, without loss of generality, we assume that legit-
imate aircraft deliver ADS-B messages at a constant rate of 6 packet/seconds,
in line with constraints defined by the standard for the maximum allowed trans-
mission rate for each aircraft [3].
4.2 Extending the ADS-B protocol
SOS provides the authentication of broadcast messages by leveraging symmetric
cryptography techniques, without modifying the legacy structure of ADS-B mes-
sages. To this aim, we extend the ADS-B technology, while pursuing standard-
compliance, by adding new type of messages dedicated to the delivering of cryp-
tography elements.
The security messages are included in the ADS-B packet as a part of the
payload, leveraging the sub-field Type of the message and specific values whose
meaning is reserved for future use by the standard. A sample picture of the
structure of security packets is provided in Fig. 3.
 
Preamble
(8 bits)
DF
(5 bits)
Capability
(3 bits)
ICAO Address
(24 bits)
Payload
(56 bits)
Parity PI
(24 bits)
Type
(8 bits)
Key/Digest
(46 bits)
Chunk ID
(2 bit)
Fig. 3. The content of verification packets transmitted by adopting SOS.
The following two verification messages are defined:
– Verification Digest, Type = 25. This message is used to allow for the trans-
mission of a message digest at the end of a slot by an aircraft.
– Verification Key, Type = 32. This message is used to transmit a verification
key used in the previous slot, allowing the verification of the full batch of
messages.
When the Type field in the payload is either 25 or 32, the following part of
the payload includes the following sub-fields:
– Chunk ID (2 bits). It specifies the unique identifier of the portion of the
following content included in this message.
– Content (46 bits). It contains the effective payload of the verification mes-
sage. In case the Type field was 25, it contains the portion of the digest.
Otherwise, in case the Type field was 32, it includes the specified segment of
the verification key for the previous slot.
4.3 Details of the SOS framework
SOS provides messages authentication leveraging delayed hash chains. While it
is inspired by the µTESLA protocol proposed in [19], it presents several modi-
fications made in order to adapt the protocol to the more severe constraints of
the ADS-B technology.
Overall, an ADS-B receiver system that runs the SOS framework can work
in two modes:
– Unsecured Mode: The receiver does not verify the authenticity of packets re-
ceived through the receiver antenna. Thus, as soon as the packet is correctly
decoded, the information are processed. The new ADS-B messages having
the Payload Type Field equal to 25 or 32 are simply discarded.
– Secured Mode. As soon as the messages are decoded, they are buffered until
the related verification digest and verification code are received. Only if
the pool of messages is verified through the procedure described below, the
information contained therein are further processed.
From now on, we will assume that the Community Server (or, equivalently,
the computational unit behind the receiver antennas) works in the Secured Mode.
The SOS scheme, depicted in Fig. 4, can be divided in three distinct phases, that
are the Setup Phase, the Online Phase and the Verification Phase.
 Fig. 4. The SOS scheme.
The steps performed in each of these phases are reported in the following.
– Setup Phase. It is executed at the bootstrap of the flight by the Avionics
Authority (i.e., a prominent authority, such as ICAO or EUROCONTROL).
Specifically, the Aircraft Authority equips the aircraft with the following
elements:
- a master key, KM , that is a K bit key uniquely assigned to the particular
aircraft for the duration of the flight;
- an integer n, that is a large integer number representing the length of
the hash chain.
Specifically, starting from the above two parameters, the root key K0 of the
aircraft is computed as:
K0 = H(H(...(H(KM )...))) = H
n(KM ), (1)
where Hn(KM ) refers to the execution of the hashing function H on the
input valueKM for n consecutive times. At the end of this phase, the Aircraft
Authority makes public the following parameters:
- the ICAO address of the flight, that is the unique identifier of the aircraft
during the present flight;
- the absolute value of t0, that represents the boot-up time of the flight, i.e.,
the time in which the aircraft was equipped with the previous materials;
- the root key K0 of the aircraft, representing the key used by the aircraft
to authenticate messages broadcast at the first useful slot.
All these parameters are shared through a publicly available server, that is
supposed to be online at least for some time during the duration of the flight.
– Online Phase. Let us focus on the operation of the aircraft during the time-
slot ti, with i > 0, and assume the aircraft actually delivers N messages,
[m1,m2, ...,mn, ...,mN ], N ≥ 1, during the time-slot ti.
At some point in time, before the end of the slot, the aircraft computes the
key for the current time-slot ti, according to the following Eq. 2:
Ki = H
n−i(KM ). (2)
The key Ki is used by the aircraft to authenticate all the messages delivered
during the time-slot ti. To this aim, the aircraft generates a message digest
hi, by using a HMAC function and the key Ki, as in the following Eq. 3:
hi = HMAC(m,Ki) = H((K
′
i ⊕ opad)||H((K
′
i ⊕ ipad)||m)), (3)
where K ′i is another secret key generated from the key Ki, the symbol ||
refers to the concatenation operation, while ipad and opad are the well-
known hexadecimal inner and outer constants, respectively [20].
The digest hi is the element that allows for the verification of the pool of
messages delivered within the time-slot ti. Given that all the messages sent in
that time-slot should be verified together, the aircraft delivers this message
as the last of its pool, within the time-slot ti.
Note that the receivers decode and store all the messages received by the
aircraft. However, they still cannot validate them, given that they miss the
information about the key Ki used to generate the digest hi. Thus, they
temporarily store the messages in a buffer.
– Verification Phase. This final phase is dedicated to the verification of the
messages delivered within the slot ti, and it takes place at the beginning of
the following slot, namely the i+ 1-th slot.
From the aircraft perspective, it consists in the delivery of a single-message,
containing the key Ki used by the aircraft to build the digest hi and to
authenticate the messages sent in the time-slot ti. The verification message
is delivered by specifying a Payload Sub-Type field equal to 32.
When the ground stations receive the message, provided that they have
received all the messages delivered by the aircraft in that time slot, they can
verify the authenticity of all the messages received within the time-slot ti.
However, this is more likely to happen on the central server of the community
controlling the particular receiver. Indeed, while some packets can be lost
by some receivers hardly reached by the aircraft messages, it is very unlikely
that a message is lost by all the receivers, since they enjoy a loose location
correlation. This is further discussed in Sec. 5.1.
This phase can be further divided in two sub-phases: the Normal Mode and
the Recovery Mode.
Normal Mode In this sub-phase the verifier (either the single receiving sensor
or the community server) checks the following conditions:
• It is possible to obtain the root key K0 by hashing exactly i times the
key Ki, thus K0 = h
i(Ki);
• The received hash h′i is equal to the hash computed over all the mes-
sages received in the time-slot ti, by using the key Ki; thus, h
′i =
HMAC(m,Ki).
In this way, the set of community receivers can be confident that the mes-
sages were authenticated using the key Ki, and that the key could only be
generated by the target aircraft, given that it is the only entity that could
have generated it. Otherwise, if the second check is not verified for any of the
active airplanes, it means that the target aircraft is under message injection
attack. Thus, the recovery mode is triggered.
Recovery Mode The aim of this phase is to make an attempt to recover the
set of legitimate messages. Specifically, the messages can be discarded, or an
attempt to recover them can be performed as discussed below:
• AssumeM = N+J distinct messages have been received by the commu-
nity server in the time-slot from a given aircraft, where N is the number
of legitimate messages and J is the number of malicious messages. Note
that N is known to the Community Server, given that the number of
messages between two consecutive Verification Key messages is fixed.
The time within the time-slot bounds is further divided in a number S
of smaller sub-slots, each containing L messages, Within the sub-slot,
the community server takes a decision based on majority voting. Thus,
it selects the messages whose position is validated by the majority of
the anchors. After applying the majority voting within all the slots, the
community server ends up with a total of T messages, with T < M .
• On the selected T messages, assumingN of these are legitimate messages,
the community server tries all the possible combinations of messages,
with the aim of finding the legitimate pool. Specifically, it evaluates all
the possible groups of N messages, checking that the digest computed
through the verification key ki and the selected pool of messages is equal
to the value hi previously delivered by the aircraft. Thus, the maximum
number of hash operations and comparisons required by the community
server to find the correct sequence of messages is ∆ =
(
T
N
)
. If a valid
pool is found, these are the authentic messages. Otherwise, no authentic
messages are found for the time-slot ti and the messages are discarded.
It is worth noting that the strategy implemented in the Verification Phase of
SOS is indeed effective against an adversary that injects fake position messages
of the target aircraft, being this position totally different from the real one. In
addition, realistic adversaries emit their messages with a SDR that is located at
the ground-level. Being the ADS-B technology very sensitive to the presence of
obstacles [16], the expected number of receivers for the fake messages is lower
than the legitimate ones, that are emitted at greater altitudes, with a reduced
probability to find obstacles and thus higher chances to be received by a greater
pool of anchors. Otherwise, if the attacker is able to force the reception of the fake
message by many anchors (i.e., by using ADS-B equipped drones), the maximum
benefit it can expect is to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) on the system, given
that none of the authentic messages will be accepted.
5 Performance Assessment
5.1 Benign Scenario
In this section we evaluate the performances of SOS in a benign scenario, with the
aim of gaining more insights on its bandwidth and computational requirements
in standard operational conditions.
In Fig. 5 we illustrate the bandwidth overhead of SOS with respect to the
size of the verification digest and the duration of the time-slot, by assuming a
fixed 128-bit verification key. As the length of the verification digest increases,
 
Fig. 5. Overhead derived by the adoption of SOS, by considering different lengths of
the verification digest and different duration of the time slot.
both the security provided to the messages and the message overhead increase,
given that more messages need to be delivered over the radio interface. At the
same time, the overhead lowers as the time-slot duration increases, given that
more messages are authenticated using the same digest. It is worth noting that
the same considerations are valid if we increase the key size, while fixing a
specific digest size. As the security of SOS lies in the size of both the verification
key and verification digest, a compromise between the bandwidth overhead and
the security level is required. In general, assuming both a key length and a
verification digest of 128 bits, and assuming to fix a 2 seconds long time-slot, the
bandwidth overhead introduced by SOS is 47.58%, that is we use roughly the
50% of the messages to authenticate the batch of messages sent within the time-
slot. Note that this overhead can be considered both as included in the actual
throughput of a peer-to-peer communication, or added as an additional overhead
to the actual rate of the ADS-B technology. In the second case, this leads to an
increase of the maximum packets rate from 6.2 to 9.14 packets/sec. Given that
the ICAO standard envisions situations in which the maximum recommended
rate can be exceeded, this is not a violation of the standard.
5.2 Comparison and Discussion
Still assuming a benign scenario, in this section we compare the performance
of SOS with closely related work, by considering the size of the cryptography
materials (keys and digest size), the bandwidth overhead, and the compliance to
the standard of all the solutions. The main results have been reported in Tab.
1.
Table 1. Comparison with security approaches published in [12], [13] and [9].
Scheme Key
Size
[bits]
Digest
Size
[bits]
Crypto
Parameters
Soundness
Slot Du-
ration
Std. com-
pliance
Overhead
[%]
SOS 128 128 ✔ 2 s ✔ 47.58
SAT [12] 128 16 ✘ 5 s ✘ 22.9
LHCSAS [13] 80 128 ✔ 1 msg. ✘ 500
HIBS [9] N/A 1,024 ✔ - ✔ 2,200
SAT [12] is based on the TESLA authentication primitive, but it is not
standard-compliant. In fact, its authors include the digest of each message within
the related ADS-B packet just before the PI field, thus modifying the message
length imposed by the standard. In addition, every 30 seconds the protocol
recommends the broadcast of a certificate including a key of 128 bits, signed
through a public key of 512 bits and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algo-
rithm (ECDSA) technique. Finally, independently from the particular hashing
algorithm used, SAT constrains the digest to be 16-bits long, hence jeopardizing
the security of the proposed scheme. Assuming that the certificate is generated
through the well-known openssl tool, it results in a minimum overhead of 22.9%.
LHCSAS [13] still breaks the compatibility with the standard: in fact, it
modifies the mandatory subType field, replacing it with cryptography data. In
addition, the aircraft delivers cryptography elements for each message, thus gen-
erating 5 additional packets for every ADS-B message.
HIBS [9] adopts robust cryptography properties. In fact, packets are authenti-
cated through a digest of 1024 bits. However, a digest of such a size is generated
for each packet, resulting in an enormous bandwidth overhead. By assuming
to work with the extended version of the scheme and maintaining the size of
the message imposed by the standard, 22 additional messages are necessary for
each payload to be authenticated, resulting in a dramatic bandwidth increase
of 2200%. Instead, SOS integrates authentication services based on symmetric
encryption within the ADS-B payload in a standard-compliant fashion. The re-
sulting overhead, as per what discussed in the previous subsection, is 47.58/%.
This slight higher overhead, however, is compensated by the enhanced security
level provided to the ADS-B technology.
SOS, as all the other solutions that do require packet fragmentation, is vul-
nerable to packet loss. In fact, if a single packet delivered within the whole
time-slot is not received by any of the ground receivers, all the packets within
the same slot cannot be verified [21]. In general, the deployment of a large num-
ber of antennas improves the probability that at least one of them receives a
packet. Even if packet loss is theoretically always possible, it is worth noting
that an high level of packet loss disrupts also the correct functioning of the
other computing solutions discussed above. Neglecting not standard-compliant
approaches and assuming different values of the slot duration of SOS, Fig. 6
evaluates the probability to successfully receive all the elements necessary to
carry out the authenticity check, both with SOS and with [9], with an increasing
loss probability on the overall system.
 
Fig. 6. Loss probability for a single packet.
SOS cannot verify the authenticity of a single packet if at least a message
transmitted in the time-slot of duration 2 seconds is lost. Assuming a default
transmission rate of 6 packet/s, the loss could occur in any of the 12 messages
sent within the time-slot, or in the 3 messages delivered in the next slot and
containing the verification key. Thus, there would be at least a single packet loss
in 15 messages. However, HIBS requires the correct reception of 23 messages
to evaluate the authenticity of the information. Thus, the packet loss would be
more disruptive in the proposal by [9] than in the SOS scheme. This is still true
also in case packet losses happen in burst, given that SOS could provide, under
reasonable assumptions, intermittent connectivity with the community server.
5.3 Scenario with a malicious adversary
In this section we evaluate the performance of SOS and the contribution in [9]
in the presence of a malicious active adversary.
During a given time-slot, the adversary injects fake packets in the wireless
communication medium, with the aim of confusing the receivers about the cur-
rent position occupied by the legitimate aircraft. In case of an active attack, the
second check performed in the verification phase of SOS fails. Specifically, the
digest computed over all the messages received by the community server from
the target aircraft, through the key Ki of the current slot ti, will not be equal
to the verification digest hi. In this situation, the community server triggers the
Recovery Mode. Thus, it first adopts an approach based on majority voting, by
discarding messages claiming a given position but received by the minority of
the anchors within a given sub-slot. On the remaining messages, the community
server checks for the pool of messages that verifies the authenticity check. This
is indeed possible thanks to the fixed number of packets between two consecu-
tive digests. The performance of SOS and HIBS in this situation are showed in
Fig. 7, assuming the maximum transmission rate by the legitimate aircraft of 6
pkts/sec.
 
Fig. 7. Number of required computations by SOS and [9] on the community servers,
under the hypothesis of attack by a malicious adversary.
Focusing on the performance of SOS, the figure shows that the shorter the
time-slot, the less the maximum number of operations that are required on
the community server’s side. Assuming a short duration of the time-slot, i.e.,
1 second, and that the adversary injects malicious packets with a rate of 6
pkts/sec, the number of operations required by the community server would
be equal to about 924, indeed a tolerable amount of HMAC for the commu-
nity server. Of course, the higher the rate of transmission by the adversary,
the higher the computational overhead by the aircraft. This becomes an issue
by assuming an higher duration of the time-slot, resulting in an unmanage-
able maximum number of comparisons when the duration of the slot is equal
or higher to 5s. The same issue emerges with the usage of the HIBS proto-
col. Assuming the transmission rate of 6 packets/sec, HIBS requires almost 4
seconds to deliver a single information packet, along with all the security ma-
terial. If the attacker injects packets at a rate of 6 pkts/sec, this would result
in more than 242 maximum computations, indeed a very resource-consuming
task. By looking at results showed in Sec. 5.1, the time-slot duration of the
SOS protocol must be carefully selected in order to trade-off between the band-
width overhead and the number of comparisons to deal with in case of at-
tack. For instance., by assuming to work with a time-slot duration of 2 sec-
onds, in case the adversary injects 6 packets, the community-server will require
about a maximum number of 221 hashes and comparisons to find the authen-
tic pool of messages. According to latest measurement with dedicated hardware
(https://gist.github.com/epixoip/a83d38f412b4737e99bbef804a270c40), about
2.25 seconds are necessary to find the legitimate pool of messages. Other mea-
surements with non-dedicated hardware can be obtained through public data
(https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Non-specialized_hardware_comparison).
6 Conclusions and Future Work
Inspired by its mandatory adoption on board of all commercial aircraft by the
2020, and pressed by its anticipated adoption by major airlines (e.g., Qatar
Airways, American Airlines and British Airways), in this paper we proposed
SOS, a lightweight and standard-compliant framework designed to guarantee
the authenticity of the communications in the ADS-B technology. The frame-
work integrates the µ-TESLA protocol in ADS-B communications, allowing to
batch-verify all the messages originated by an airplane in a given time-slot. In
addition, the framework leverages a majority voting filtering stage in the mes-
sage reception phase and it is suitable for deployment on community-oriented
services, as the emerging OpenSky-Network community. Moreover, it is resilient
to active attacks attempting to poisoning the message authentication process.
Finally, comparisons with state of the art solutions do show that SOS is the
winning solution in terms of provided security and achieved performance.
Future research activities include refining the packet loss hypothesis (study-
ing packet burst loss model) and the implementation of the proposed framework
using commercial Software Defined Radios.
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